The epistemology of archaeological perception by Campbell-Bell, Damien
Archaeology is primarily an epistemologically realist    
enterprise; it seeks to use the senses, especially vision, to 
learn things about the traces of the past which are    
available to us in the present. From these traces, most 
archaeologists (with a few notable exceptions such as 
Shanks and Tilley, 1992) would insist that they try to find 
out something real about the past.  
There are few remaining naïve realists who treat data as 
speaking for itself in an unproblematic and objective 
manner, but in certain respects this is still common at an 
implicit, untheorised level (Johnson, 2011). One example 
lies in the perceptual roots of archaeological knowledge 
creation; much work presupposes that past peoples    
perceived in the same way as modern western people. 
However, whilst humans are genetically much the same 
now as 40,000 years ago (Renfew, 2005), the fact that 
they were enmeshed in different cultures raises the    
possibility of an as yet unquantified perceptual gap.  
A number of archaeologists have discussed issues related 
to this perceptual gap, often focussing on the landscape, 
but few have made any attempt to resolve it (See for  
example Johnson, 2010; Renfrew, 1994; Thomas, 2001). 
One of the few archaeologists to do so is Zubrow (1994), 
who posited universal cognitive principles which exist in 
all peoples at all times, however, he offers no justification 
as to why any such universals should exist. Just as we  
require a theoretical framework to deal with data        
appropriately, so we need a perceptual one. As it         
currently stands we have no such framework to underpin            
archaeological epistemology; therefore a proper           
investigation of perceptual research is required. 
Perceptual Research 
Internalist perceptual theories ,such as psychological   
empiricism, can imply that perception is directly affected 
by cultural background, since they involve the              
construction of mental models informed by past          
experience. Externalist approaches, such as ecological 
perception, treat the world as its own best model and 
may indicate that perception  is cross-cultural. Just as 
perceptual theories offer contrasting views of cross-
cultural perception, so too do perceptual experiments. 
Whilst experiments using artificial stimuli (See Fig. 1) 
offer differing results (See for example Hudson, 1960; 
Jahoda and McGurk, 1974), those using non-artificial  
stimuli show that some aspects of perception are present 
at birth or undergo early self-driven development 
(Gordon, 1989). To some degree then it seems that      
perception is innate and therefore cross-cultural. There 
are however major issues with making use of perceptual 
research: 
 Cross-cultural experiments have often used artificial 
stimuli, not real world situations 
 Perceptual research can only ever be performed with 
modern people 
 Archaeologists seek to understand past people 
In order to quantify the potential perceptual gap we must 
therefore make use of one of the fundamental premises 
of archaeology, uniformitarianism.  
The Epistemic State of Archaeology 
Uniformitarianism, the idea that processes occur in the 
same way at all times, could allow us to argue that if    
culture has no effect on perception today, then neither 
should it have done in the past. If the reverse is found to 
be the case, then our ability to make meaningful        
statements about the past would be considerably         
reduced. Archaeology is reliant on uniformitarianism; it is 
a logical assumption which must be made in order to   
undertake any research (Bahn, 2005: 206) and thus its use 
in this context should not be considered problematic in  
Figure 1– Examples of the kind of abstract stimuli often used in        
perceptual research. In the top image both spots are the same colour  
as shown by the overlapping spots. The bottom one appears lighter as 
everything around it has been darkened as if in shadow, whilst it has 
not. In the Müller-Lyer illusion below, the different fin orientation 
makes the left line seem longer. Neither of these work in the real world. 
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itself. It does however open up any perceptual framework 
to potential problems; if the perceptual processes of    
archaeologists and past people are the same, but the   
input is different (archaeological record vs. past living  
culture) then the output (perception/interpretation) will 
be different too (See Figs. 2 and 3). This is essentially a 
matter of the representativeness of the archaeological 
record, but it is a problem already present in archaeology. 
Bronze cup melted down (3) 
Dancing (1) 
Some foods, especially 
if prepared off site (2) 
Tattooed body decays (4) 
Pot broken and bank ploughed out (5) 
Stone tool not recognised (7) Ditch not Excavated (6) 
Figure 2- The transformation of a living culture into the              
archaeological record. Based on points 1-7 made by Collins (1975) 
1. Not all behaviour results in patterned material culture 
2. Of those that do, not all can enter the archaeological record 
3. Of those that can, not all will 
4. Of those that do, not all will be preserved 
5. Of those that are preserved, not all survive indefinitely 
6. Of those that are preserved, not all will be uncovered by the 
archaeologist 
7. Of those that are, not all will be recognised or identified 
people they study, and know how accurate it is possible 
for archaeological hypotheses to be. The methodology of 
such an experiment could also potentially be used to test 
previous hypotheses about a landscape, and serve as a 
crowd sourced interpretation methodology, avoiding  the 
biases inherent in data collection. 
Outcomes 
If culture is found not to effect perception, or not to effect 
certain aspects of it, we can be confident in our             
interpretations, so long as we focus on these aspects. If it 
does  however, archaeologists must take one of two 
paths, either follow Shanks and Tilley (1992) and accept          
archaeology as being about the present, or work with an 
increasingly definable multiplicity of potential pasts. Note 
that this would not be a descent into relativism, but 
would simply acknowledge that we could no longer      
propose a singular view of the past. Ultimately this would 
leave archaeology no worse off than it currently is, but 
would entail accepting that it involves unresolvable      
unknowns, and adjusting its aims and practice                
accordingly. There is of course a third option of ignoring 
the result and carrying on as if there were no problem at 
the heart of archaeological epistemology, as is the current 
trend. It is hoped that archaeologists would have the 
courage not to follow this course however. The final     
potential outcome is an inconclusive result, and whilst this 
would be undeniably disappointing, the experiment would 
still have value as a step towards an appropriate        
methodology for investigating this important issue. 
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Figure 3– The effect of input under the same processing conditions 
If we were to reject this notion of perceptual unity       
archaeologists would still have to work around the    
problems inherent in the archaeological record, but  
without any framework to relate their interpretations to 
those of past people. This would involve both data and 
interpretations of that data which relate to the past in an 
unknown way. If we accept this use of uniformitarianism 
however, archaeologists must only deal with a single   
unknown, the representativeness of the archaeological 
record, which whilst never fully quantifiable is               
increasingly definable, allowing us to make increasingly 
more accurate interpretations. With the current         
epistemological state of archaeology, with its two        
unknowns, no amount of additional data, refinement of 
technique, or new theories will allow us to do this.   
Since most cross-cultural work uses artificial stimuli their 
results can be questioned, and so ecological perceptual 
experiments could help clarify cross-cultural issues. Such 
an experiment, involving people from a broad range of   
cultural backgrounds with a range of archaeological 
knowledge, would allow us to quantify the potential size 
of the perceptual gap between archaeologists and the 
